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Abstract 
We present LADDER, the first deep reinforcement learning 
agent that can successfully learn control policies for large-
scale real-world problems directly from raw inputs com-
posed of high-level semantic information. The agent is 
based on an asynchronous stochastic variant of DQN (Deep 
Q Network) named DASQN. The inputs of the agent are 
plain-text descriptions of states of a game of incomplete in-
formation, i.e. real-time large scale online auctions, and the 
rewards are auction profits of very large scale. We apply the 
agent to an essential portion of JD’s online RTB (real-time 
bidding) advertising business and find that it easily beats the 
former state-of-the-art bidding policy that had been careful-
ly engineered and calibrated by human experts: during 
JD.com’s June 18th anniversary sale, the agent increased the 
company’s ads revenue from the portion by more than 50%, 
while the advertisers’ ROI (return on investment) also im-
proved significantly. 
Introduction 
Researchers have made great progress recently in learning 
to control agents directly from raw high-dimensional sen-
sory inputs like vision in domains such as Atari 2600 
games (Mnih et al. 2015), where reinforcement learning 
(RL) agents have human-level performance. However, 
most real-world problems have high-level semantic infor-
mation inputs rather than sensory inputs, where what hu-
man experts usually do is to read and understand inputs in 
plain-text form and act after judging by expertise. Real-
world problems are much more challenging than video 
games in that they always have a larger solution space and 
in that their states can only be partially observed. Such 
real-world problems have not been tackled by any state-of-
the-art RL agents until now. 
This paper demonstrates an agent named LADDER for 
such a problem.  Using a deep asynchronous stochastic Q-
network (DASQN), the agent improves the performance of 
JD’s real-time bidding (RTB) ad business. 
 RTB is the most promising field in online advertising 
which greatly promotes the effectiveness of the industry 
(Yuan, Wang, and Zhao 2013). A typical RTB environ-
ment (Figure 1) consists of ad exchanges (ADXs), supply 
side platforms (SSPs), data management platforms (DMPs) 
and demand side platforms (DSPs). ADXs and DSPs uti-
lize algorithms to buy/sell ads in real-time. SSPs integrate 
information of publishers (i.e. online media) and offer ads 
requests of the publishers to ADXs. An ADX puts the of-
fers out to DSPs for bidding. DSPs target appropriate ads 
to the involved user based on information supplied by 
DMPs and return the ads with their bids to the ADX which 
displays ads of the highest bidder and charges the winner 
DSP with general second price (Varian 2007). 
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Figure 1:  A typical RTB auction environment 
Obviously, the process of many DSPs/ADXs bidding for 
an ad offer is an auction game (Myerson 1981) of incom-
plete information. However, the online ads industry just 
ignores this fact and considers RTB a solved problem: all 
existing DSPs model auction games as supervised learning 
(SL) problems by predicting the click through rate (CTR) 
(McMahan et al. 2013) or conversion rate (CVR) (Yuan, 
Wang, and Zhao 2013) of ads and using effective cost per 
mille (ECPM) as bids (Chen et al. 2011). 
JD.com started its DSP business in 2014, at first we em-
ployed the industry state-of-the-art approach of ECPM bid-
ding with a calibrated CTR model (McMahan et al. 2013) 
as depicted in Figure 2. Soon we found it impossible for 
the SL calibration model to have a stable performance in 
practice, which was critical for the business to keep break-
ing even. As a result, we introduced a method with fine 
grained bid coefficients calibrated by human experts. In a 
nutshell, our bidding mechanism then was a human-
machine hybrid control system where operators modified 
the calibration coefficients tens of times per day. 
For the obvious inefficiency of the hybrid system, we 
started research on utilizing RL algorithms to solve the 
auction game, during which we met several problems: 
First, the solution space of the auction game is tremen-
dous. JD DSP system is bidding for 100,000s of auctions 
per second, assume we have 10 actions and each day is an 
episode (ad plans are usually on a daily basis), simple math 
shows the solution space is of 10ଵ଴వ . For comparison, the 
solution space of the game of Go is about 10ଷ଺଴ (Allis and 
others 1994; Silver et al. 2016).  
Second, state-of-the-art RL algorithms are inherently se-
quential, hence cannot be applied to large-scale practical 
problems such as the auction game, for our online service 
cannot afford the inefficiencies of sequential algorithms. 
Third, auction requests are actually triggered by JD users 
and randomness of human behaviors implies stochastic 
transitions of states. That’s very different from Atari games, 
text-based games (Narasimhan, Kulkarni, and Barzilay 
2015) and the game of Go (Silver et al. 2016). 
Besides, we have widely ranged rewards of which the 
maximum may be 100,000 times larger than the minimum, 
which implies only very expressive models are suitable. 
Last but not least, there’s much human-readable high 
level semantic information in JD which is crucial for bid-
ding, e.g. the stock keeping units (SKUs) that a customer 
viewed or bought recently, how long ago she viewed or 
bought them, the price of the advertised SKU, etc. Alt-
hough sophisticated feature engineering can utilize these 
information in a model like wide and deep models (Cheng 
et al. 2016) or factorization machines (Rendle 2012) as is 
already in place in the hybrid system, taking into account 
JD’s scale, such models will be of billions of features and 
therefore too heavy to react instantly to the rapidly varying 
auction environment, leading to poor performance. 
In this paper, we model the auction game as a partially 
observable Markov decision process (POMDP) and present 
the DASQN algorithm which successfully solve the inher-
ently synchronousness of RL algorithms and the stochastic 
transitions of the game. We encode each auction request 
into plain text in a domain specific natural language, feed 
the encoded request to a deep convolutional neural net-
works (CNN) and make full use of the high-level semantic 
information without any sophisticated feature engineering. 
This results in a lightweight model both responsive and 
expressive which can update in real-time and reacts to the 
changes of the auction environment rapidly. Our whole 
architecture is named LADDER.  
We evaluated LADDER on a significant portion of JD 
DSP business with online A/B test and the experimental 
results indicate that the industry was far from solving the 
RTB problem: LADDER easily outperformed the human 
expert calibrated ECPM policy: during JD.com’s June 18th 
anniversary sale, the agent raised the company’s ads reve-
nue from the portion by more than 50%, while the ROI of 
the advertisers also improved as much as 17%. 
Background 
RL provides the ability for an agent to learn from interac-
tions with an environment 𝐸. In this paper, we consider the 
auction environment as 𝐸. At each time step 𝑡, the agent 
observes an auction 𝑥௧  from a publisher and a set of ads 
will participate in the auction. The agent selects a legal 
action 𝑎௧ ∈  Α =  {0, … , 𝐶} and acts in 𝐸. After a while, the 
agent gets a real number reward 𝑟௧ from 𝐸. We formularize 
this sequential process as (𝑥଴, 𝑎଴, 𝑟଴, … , 𝑥௧ , 𝑎௧ , 𝑟௧ , … ) whose 
dynamics can be defined by the joint probability distribu-
tion Pr{𝑋௧ାଵ =  𝑥௧ାଵ, 𝑅௧ = 𝑟௧ | 𝑥଴, 𝑎଴, 𝑟଴, … , 𝑥௧ , 𝑎௧}. 
Obviously 𝑥 cannot fully reflect the state of 𝐸. In fact, 
we define the state of  𝐸  at  𝑡  as  𝑠௧ =  𝜙(𝑥଴, 𝑎଴, 𝑟଴, … , 𝑥௧) . 
𝑠௧ାଵ  depends on 𝑠௧  and 𝑎௧ with a certain probability. We 
define dynamics of  𝐸  as  p(𝑠௧ାଵ, 𝑟௧|𝑠௧ , 𝑎௧) =  Pr{𝑆௧ାଵ =
𝑠௧ାଵ, 𝑅௧ = 𝑟௧|𝑆௧ = 𝑠௧ , 𝐴௧ = 𝑎௧}.  
We model the auction game as a POMDP rather than a 
standard MDP because in such a real-world problem very 
little of the state can be observed (e.g. we never know the 
users’ behaviors in physical stores). The game is assumed 
to terminate and restart in cycle. The state space of the 
POMDP is huge but still finite, standard RL methods such 
as Q-learning or policy gradient can be applied to learn an 
agent through the interaction with 𝐸. 
Q-learning and its variants especially DQN (Mnih et al. 
2015) learns a value function 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎; 𝜃)  which indicates 
the future rewards since current state and derives a policy 
𝜋∗(𝑠, 𝑎) =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥௔𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎; 𝜃), 𝑎 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝐶} . The loss 
function of DQN at step 𝑡 is defined as:  
𝐿(𝜃௧) = (𝑟௧ + 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑥௔𝑄(𝑠௧ାଵ, 𝑎; 𝜃்) − 𝑄(𝑠௧, 𝑎௧ ; 𝜃௧))ଶ  (1) 
where 𝑠௧ାଵ is the state next to 𝑠௧ and 𝜃் keeps a periodic 
copy of 𝜃. 𝐿(𝜃௧) is the foundation of our formulation. 
Related Work 
(Mnih et al. 2015) proposed DQN which combined RL and 
CNN and learned directly from screen pixels and outper-
formed human experts in Atari 2600 games. (Gu et al. 
2016) improved the method with a new network architec-
ture. (Van Hasselt, Guez, and Silver 2016) proposed Dou-
ble DQN to tackle the overestimate problem in DQN. 
POMDPs were well studied in (Jaakkola, Singh, and 
Jordan 1995), (Kaelbling, Littman, and Cassandra 1998), 
and (Monahan 1982). (Hausknecht and Stone 2015) mod-
eled Atari 2600 games as POMDPs by replacing a full 
connection lay in DQN by an LSTM. 
All these algorithms are sequential in that they can only 
act once after each step of SGD, which is unacceptable in 
our application scenario. (Mnih et al. 2016) presented A3C 
and n-step Q-learning among other asynchronous algo-
rithms which decoupled RL algorithms to some extent in 
that agents could act n steps between 2 training steps, as 
well as could learn from several copies of the same game 
at the same time. However, A3C and n-step Q-learning still 
cannot solve the auction game because our scale requires 
full decoupling rather than semi decoupling. 
In parallel with our work, (Cai et al. 2017) presented a 
RL method for RTB problem based on dynamic program-
ming and CTR prediction, which also went beyond the 
traditional ECPM policy. 
(Silver et al. 2016) applied RL, CNNs and Monte Carlo 
Tree Search to the game of Go and their agent namely Al-
phaGo beat the top human experts in an open competition. 
We argue that our auction game has a much larger solution 
space than Go, which makes tree search methods thorough-
ly impractical. Furthermore, Go is of perfect information, 
while auction games are of incomplete information in the 
form of human readable high-level semantic info. 
Recurrent neural networks, especially LSTMs are exten-
sively used in NLP tasks. Text-based game was researched 
by (Narasimhan, Kulkarni, and Barzilay 2015), they used 
LSTMs instead of the CNN in DQN. However, the two 
game studied had a tiny state space compared to auction 
games. In addition, RNNs need very sophisticated feature 
engineering to understand high-level semantic information, 
which makes the model too large to react instantly. 
Character-level CNNs were proposed by (Zhang, Zhao, 
and LeCun 2015), which perform well on text classifica-
tion tasks without word embedding. (Kim et al. 2016) in-
troduced another character-level CNN with character em-
bedding as inputs. 
The Architecture of the DSP System in JD 
As the largest retailer in China, JD.com started its DSP 
business as early as 2014 to satisfy merchants’ increasing 
demands for more sales. An overview of the architecture of 
our DSP system is illustrated in Figure 2. When an auction 
request from an ADX arrives, the system recalls hundreds 
of ads inventories as candidates from an ads repository 
with millions of ads. The ranking module ranks these can-
didates and identifies the top few ads for bidding (typically 
top 1). The bidding module computes and returns the ads 
and bid to the ADX as described in the induction section. 
The industrially proven auction mechanism in such auc-
tion games is the general second price (GSP) method 
which has a Nash equilibrium in position auctions and is 
extensively used all over the world. In a GSP auction, a 
winner DSP knows only the bid of the DSP in the place 
immediately behind it because that’s the winner’s charge, 
but none of the losers knows anything about any rivals’ bid.  
DSPs don’t even know how many rivals are bidding in the 
auction. The auction game is a typical game of incomplete 
information where each DSP is a player (Gibbons 1992). 
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Figure 2:  The design and evolution of JD DSP’s architecture 
The universal business mode of DSPs is that ad impres-
sions from ADX are bought by cost per mille (CPM) and 
sold to advertisers by cost per click/action (CPC/CPA) to 
maximize ads performance. Though JD has several charg-
ing mechanisms other than CPC (CPA, for example), we 
speak of CPC in this paper for simplicity and the methods 
discussed are applicable to others. 
We used ECPM =  Q ∗  bid௖௟௜௖௞  as described in (Varian 
2007) for ranking, in which Q  reflects business require-
ments (e.g. predicted CTR/CVR of the ads) and bid௖௟௜௖௞ 
was advertisers’ CPC bids for their clicks. So there is a 
natural gap between revenue and expenditure which we 
must control in the bidding module. 
Since 2014, we were using the state-of-the-art ECPM 
bidding policy. We tried to calibrate Q to a click through 
rate (CTRிெ) as depicted in (McMahan et al. 2013), except 
that we used a factorization machine (Rendle 2012) instead 
of Poisson regression for calibration. Our ranking model 
has a structure similar to wide and deep models (Cheng et 
al. 2016) with billions of weights and tens of gigabyte of 
memory and disk space requirements, meaning Q can hard-
ly react to the rapidly changing auction environment with-
out delay because the model is too huge to update in time, 
leading us to design a real-time impression-click data 
stream for online learning of the calibration CTR model. 
Afterwards the data stream was reused by LADDER. 
 Handling the huge amount of SKUs and hundreds of 
millions of active users of JD and tens of unknown rival 
DSPs exceeded the system’s capabilities. Moreover, busi-
ness requirements demand tradeoffs between profits and 
total revenue, e.g. maximize revenue while keeping certain 
net profit margins to generate economies of scale. To fulfill 
such requirements, at the end of 2015 we introduced a 
mechanism with traffic-type level coefficients of bid cali-
brated by human experts.  
Consequently, the human-machine hybrid control sys-
tem computed the bid of every auction as bid஽ௌ௉ =
 Coef௛௨௠௔௡ ∗ CTRிெ ∗ bid௖௢௦௧/௖௟௜௖௞  where human experts 
modified Coef௛௨௠௔௡ tens of times per day.  
The Learning Ad Exchange Bidder 
In early 2016, we began the research of applying RL algo-
rithms to the RTB auction games. Finally we succeeded in 
devising a RL agent named LADDER (short for the learn-
ing ad exchange bidder).  
Modeling 
We model the auction game as a POMDP. Here we give 
some important definitions about the POMDP. 
Episodes. Naturally, we define every day as an episode. 
Rewards. To control deficits, we use net profits of every 
auction as rewards of LADDER. Assume our expense (by 
CPM) and income (by CPC) at time 𝑡 is 𝑖௧  and 𝑒௧  respec-
tively, the reward of the auction at time 𝑡 is r௧ = 𝑖௧ − 𝑒௧ . 
For simplicity we use CNY as units of all related variables. 
Notice that 𝑖௧ is always zero unless the user click the ad. 
In practice, non-zero 𝑖௧  is usually 10ଷ~10ହ times larger 
than 𝑒௧. Considering the relatively low click rate, the func-
tion we are fitting is extremely steep with most of its val-
ues negative while a small subset are high positive. To 
avoid financial loss, both the tiny negative values and the 
positive ones must be caught exactly by our model. This 
implies that high expressive models as CNNs are required. 
Actions. We define actions of the auction game at time 𝑡 
as 𝑎௧ = 𝑏𝑖𝑑௧  because bids happen to be discrete. Assume 
our bid ceiling is 𝐶, our actions would be from the set 𝐴 =
[0, 0.01, 0.02, … , 𝐶]  because the minimal unit of CNY 
is 0.01. As a result, our action space is in thousands and 
expected to be very sparse in the training data. 
States. The high-level semantic information 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜௧  we 
can get in JD at time 𝑡 is about active users, SKUs and ads. 
That’s the partially observable state. Generally, the 𝑡 th 
auction can be formularized as a text description in a do-
main specific natural language according to  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜௧ , as 
shown in the following example. All high-level semantic 
information in the example is in italic: 
Here’s an auction from publisher p: user u is access-
ing some_site.com/p, u has bought SKUs of ID s1, s2 
and s3 a days ago, u browsed SKUs of ID s4 and s5 b 
days ago… The candidate ad is SKU s6 which is de-
livered by JD logistic network... 
Notice that all the numbers above (s1… s6, a, b) are in 
plain text. There is a practical reason: ID numbering rule of 
JD requires that similar entities have close IDs, e.g. iph-
one7’s ID is 3133817, and iphone7 plus’s ID is 3133857 
which seems similar, so an experienced expert can judge 
from plain text that 3133857 would have similar perfor-
mance as 3133817 in the same auction context even if 
she’s never seen the former. RNN-based NLP models need 
elaborate feature engineering (e.g. character n-grams) to 
utilize such semantic, but such models will comprise bil-
lions of weights and therefore too large to react instantly to 
the auction environment, as discussed earlier. On the con-
trary, CNNs are good at recognizing similar patterns. 
Based on this interesting observation as well as the defi-
nitions, we manage to build a solution. For the 𝑡th auction, 
we have a function 𝜙 which generates a text description 
from  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜௧  as the above example and one-hot encodes the 
text as described in (Zhang, Zhao, and LeCun 2015) and 
feeds the encoded content to a CNN. In fact, the model 
works well without elaborate feature engineering, thus is 
space-efficient enough (less than 1Mb) to update instantly. 
Layer Input Patch size Weights 
Convolution 600 × 71 × 1 71 × 7 9.94K 
Max pool 594 × 1 × 20 3 × 1  
Convolution 198 × 1 × 20 7 × 1 2.8K 
Max pool 192 × 1 × 20 3 × 1  
Convolution 64 × 1 × 20 5 × 1 5.0K 
Max pool 60 × 1 × 50 3 × 1  
Convolution 20 × 1 × 50 5 × 1 12.5K 
Max pool 16 × 1 × 50 2 × 1  
Hidden 8 × 1 × 50  160K 
Linear 400   
Table 1:  Architecture of LADDER’s convolutional network 
In our productive model, the input text is encoded into a 
600 × 71 matrix, of which 600 is the max length of the 
description and 71 is the alphabet size. In order to save 
response time of the online service, we formulize the input 
text in a sort of shorthand with only key information rather 
than in full text. Also, we use a traditional architecture ra-
ther than the state-of-the-art Inception networks or ResNets 
(Szegedy et al. 2017) for the same reason. 
Table 1 depicts the architecture of our model with output 
number of the linear layer (aka action space and bid ceiling) 
omitted deliberately for commercial privacy. All layers 
except the last one use RELU as activation functions. 
Deep Asynchronous Stochastic Q-learning 
RL algorithms are inherently sequential, though A3C and 
other algorithms in (Mnih et al. 2016) made it possible to 
act an entire episode between each training step, they are 
still sequential in nature because the two processes of act-
ing and training in those algorithms are still serially exe-
cuted. That’s unacceptable for an online DSP service that 
must respond to each of the huge amount of auctions in 
several milliseconds. From this perspective, training during 
serving is absolutely unfeasible, needless to say it requires 
hundreds of times more servers, which is uneconomical. 
Distinguishingly, we solve this problem by introducing a 
fully decoupled parallel mechanism which results in a fully 
asynchronous RL algorithm in which all three processes 
(learning from the environment, acting in the environment, 
and observing the environment) are running simultaneous-
ly without waiting for each other. Observing is also decou-
pled because whether an action would result in a positive 
reward can only be observed asynchronously after tens of 
minutes when the ad is clicked. Each of the three processes 
in our algorithm can be deployed to threads in multiple 
machines to improve runtime performance (Figure 3). 
Though every auction in which we participate shares the 
same ads budgets and stock units, state transitions in the 
auction game are stochastic for the uncertainty of user ac-
tivity. Under this consideration, our algorithm samples the 
next state of the 𝑡th auction from the set (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝐼௧௥௔௡௦௜௧௜௢௡] 
where 𝐼௧௥௔௡௦௜௧௜௢௡ is a hyper parameter of the algorithm.  
Besides, different publishers always have very different 
CTR, CVR or ROI. Therefore, auctions from different pub-
lishers should be considered as different games. It’s chal-
lenging for an agent to bid different auction games at the 
same time. However, training independent agents for dif-
ferent games as (Mnih et al. 2015) will make more states 
unobservable. Our solution is requiring the next state of the 
𝑡th auction to be from the same publisher 𝑃୲. 
Data Augmentation and the Loss 
Assume we have a stochastic transition (𝜙௧ష , 𝑎௧ష , 𝑟௧ష , 𝜙௧శ) 
as discussed above, considering the property of GSP auc-
tions and the definition of 𝑎௧ష and 𝑟௧ష, we have a deduction 
that any bid above  𝑎௧ష would win the auction 𝑡ି and any 
bid below 𝑟௧ష would lose the auction. Given the deduction, 
for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, we redefine rewards of the auction 𝑡ି as: 
𝑟௧ష,௔ ≔ ൜
0
𝑟௧ష
                                           for all 𝑎 < 𝑎௧ష
otherwise
(2) 
Combining Formula (1) and Formula (2) results in the 
following definition: 
𝑦௧ష,௔ ≔ ൜
𝑟௧ష,௔
𝑟௧ష,௔ + γmax௔ᇲ 𝑄(𝜙௧శ , 𝑎ᇱ; 𝜃்)
 terminal 𝜙௧శ
otherwise
 (3) 
And we define the loss function of LADDER as: 
𝐿௅஺஽஽ாோ(𝜃) =
ଵ
஼ାଵ
∑ (y௧,௔ − Q(ϕ୲ష , 𝑎; θ))ଶ஼௔ୀ଴              (4) 
The original loss of DQN as Formula (1) still works, es-
pecially for application whose actions are not as correlated 
as auction games. Although we use DQN in this paper, 
Double DQN and Dueling Double DQN (Wang et al. 2015) 
can be naturally incorporated in out algorithm. 
To maximize revenue while keeping breakeven, we in-
troduce a weighted sampling method to tune the im-
portance of positive rewards, which is controlled by the 
hyper parameter 𝜋. We also use an experience memory as 
in DQN. The full algorithm, which we call deep asynchro-
nous stochastic Q-learning, is presented in Algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1 Deep asynchronous stochastic Q-learning 
 
Initialize experience memory 𝐷 to capacity 𝑁 
Initialize parameters (𝜃, 𝜃ௌ, 𝜃்)  of action-value function 𝑄 
with random weights 
procedure Serving 
 while true do 
Get auction 𝐴௧  of publisher 𝑃௧ at timestamp t 
𝜙௧ ≔ 𝜙(𝐴௧ , 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜௧ , )  
Asynchronously fetch snapshot of parameters 𝜃 to 𝜃ௌ 
With probability ε select a random bid 𝑎௧ 
otherwise select 𝑎௧ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥௔𝑄∗(𝜙௧ , 𝑎; 𝜃ௌ) 
Respond to bidding request 𝐴௧ with bid 𝑎௧ 
end while 
procedure OBSERVING 
while true do 
Update 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 
Observe reward 𝑟௧ᇱ and store (𝜙௧ᇱ, 𝑎௧ᇱ, 𝑟௧ᇱ) in 𝐷 
end while 
procedure TRAINING 
while true do 
Sample random mini-batch of stochastic transitions 
(𝜙௧ష , 𝑎௧ష , 𝑟௧ష , 𝜙௧శ) from 𝐷 with probability: 
prob௧ష = ቄ
𝜋
1                                         
if 𝑟௧ష < 0
otherwise
 
where 𝑡ି and 𝑡ା meet the constraints: 
𝑡ା~𝑈((𝑡ି, 𝑡ି + 𝐼௧௥௔௡௦௜௧௜௢௡]) and 𝑃௧శ = 𝑃௧ష  
For all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, perform: 
𝑦௧ష,௔ ≔ ൜
𝑟௧ష,௔
𝑟௧ష ,௔ + 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑥௔ᇲ𝑄(𝜙௧శ, 𝑎ᇱ; 𝜃்)
  terminal 𝜙௧శ
otherwise
 
Perform an SGD step on ଵ
஼ାଵ
∑ (y௧,௔ − Q(ϕ୲ష, 𝑎; θ))ଶ஼௔ୀ଴  
𝜃் ≔ 𝜃 every 𝐼 ்  steps 
end while 
main 
Asynchronously start SERVING, OBSERVING and TRAINING 
 
Experimental Results 
The experiments of LADDER were run on four important 
publishers that occupy a significant part of the revenues of 
JD.com’s DSP business. We try to improve both revenue 
and profits of the publishers in the experiments. 
Experiment Setup 
We run the training procedure of Algorithm 1 on 4 Tesla 
K80 GPUs and the serving procedure on 24 PC servers 
(Figure 3) with a high-performance C++ sparse convolver. 
We use RMSProp to optimize the loss in Formula (4) with 
a learning rate of 5ିଽ. The usage of ε-greedy was restricted 
with an ε of  1ିଷ  to minimize negative influence on the 
business. Training was decomposed into 2 phases: 
Imitation. We filled the experience memory with data 
generated by the ECPM policy of the hybrid system.  At 
this stage, before enough self-generated data get into the 
memory, LADDER is just learning the ECPM policy. In 
this cold-starting phase, LADDER interacts little with the 
environment thus ensures that losses are under control. 
Introspection. After several hours of imitation (the time 
actually required depends on 𝑁), LADDER starts to learn 
from data generated by its own policy. 
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Figure 3:  An example of asynchronous deployment of LADDER 
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Figures 4: Experiment results with the ECPM policy as baseline. 
Evaluation 
In May 2017, we evaluated LADDER with online A/B test 
in an overlapping experiment system similar to (Tang et al. 
2010) and regarded the ECPM policy as baseline. In the 
beginning, LADDER was bidding 10% of the auctions per 
day and the remaining 90% was running the baseline. We 
launched LADDER at 90% of the auctions in the 8th day 
and keep the rest 10% as holdback which run the baseline 
policy for months for the sake of scientific rigor. The ex-
periment system performed a proportional normalization to 
all experiments for ease of comparison. 
Figures 4 shows the performance comparisons between 
LADDER and baseline. We normalized all data in the fig-
ures into range [0,1]  for privacy. Figure 4(a) shows the 
rewards (profits) comparison, where we can see that 
LADDER incurred huge losses on the first day in the imi-
tation phase because it tended to bid up all requests for 
exploration. It soon turned into the second phase and 
caught up with the baseline the next day, and eventually 
outperformed the baseline since day 5. Notice that the Q 
curve well fitted the curve of rewards of LADDER. There 
was a retreat at day 8 because we launched LADDER that 
day, therefore the experimental data were mixed up. 
Figure 4(b) and Figure 4(c) shows the revenue growth:  
LADDER made a huge improvement by more than 50% 
since the first day. It seems that LADDER had learned the 
key of economies of scale that more revenues always gen-
erate more profits. Figure 4(d) shows that LADDER also 
raised CTR as much as about 35%, which is reasonable 
because the experimented publishers was on a CPC basis. 
 
Figure 5: Experimental data on JD’s June 18th anniversary sale  
According to the holdback, the improvements are per-
manent. Especially, during JD.com’s June 18th anniversary 
sale of 2017, LADDER increased the revenue of the 4 pub-
lishers by 54% and the advertisers ROI by 17% as shown 
in Figure 5, thus contributed a growth of 17% to the total 
revenue of JD’s DSP business and 7% to the total ROI of 
the sale. The improvement during the sale proves the 
adaptability and responsiveness of LADDER in a highly 
volatile and competitive environment. 
  
 
Figures 6: The influence of weighted sampling. 
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Exploration and Exploitation 
The hyper parameter 𝝅 controls the balance between ex-
ploration and exploitation. To maximize the revenues, our 
launched deployment set  𝝅  to 0.6. As Figures 6 depict, 
when we decrease 𝝅 from 0.6 to 0.55, revenue decrease 
while rewards and CTR increase, which means the agent 
tends to explore less aggressively. 
Visualization 
In order to figure out LADDER’s capability of understand-
ing high-level semantic information embedded in the plain-
text description inputs, we use t-SNE to visualize the out-
puts of the hidden layer. Our analysis is from two angles. 
 
(a) 
(b) 
Figures 7: t-SNE visualization of LADDER. Different colors rep-
resent different publishers in (a) and different semantic in (b) 
Multiple Games in a Single Model 
As mentioned earlier, LADDER serves very different pub-
lishers (aka different auction games) simultaneously. Alt-
hough challenging, Figure 5 shows that LADDER had suc-
cessfully learned from the plain-text inputs the difference 
of the publishers. It surpassed the baseline in revenue and 
CTR for each publisher evaluated. To technically verify 
how well LADDER can distinguish different publishers, 
we use publisher type as label and visualize 1000,000 ran-
dom samples in Figure 7(a). As expected, all 4 publishers 
are mapped into separate clusters perfectly. 
Complex Semantic 
In Figure 7(a), samples of the same publisher scatter into 
several clusters. In fact, LADDER’s learned semantic 
much more complex than publisher IDs. For further analy-
sis, we visualize data only of publisher 1 from the same 
1000,000 samples. As Figure 7(b) shows, LADDER has 
learned rather complex conditions from the plain-text in-
puts, which are essential to bid an auction. E.g. SKUs de-
livered by JD logistic network (JDLN) may be more attrac-
tive for a cold-start user because JDLN is well-known to 
feature a superior user experience.  As the left part of Fig-
ure 7(b) indicates, LADDER recognizes these situations. 
Future Work 
Real-time online auctions are not the only large scale real 
world problems in which human-level agents excel. Con-
sidering that ADXs mimics stock exchanges, applying 
LADDER in quantitative trading is also of great interest 
and challenge. 
Recommendation system is a domain with similarities to 
online advertising, so our approach should work in the area 
with a domain specific loss function. 
What we are working on is applying LADDER not only 
for bidding but also in the ranking phase of online advertis-
ing, which may also bring significant business benefits. 
Conclusions 
We present a reinforcement learning agent namely LAD-
DER in this paper for solving the auction game of JD DSP. 
Our aim is to create a human-level agent that is capable of 
not only saving manpower while performing as well as or 
even better than humans, but also directly understanding 
the situation of an auction from a plain-text description, as 
human experts do. As the result, LADDER reach the goal 
by easily outperforming the existing industrial state-of-the-
art solution in A/B tests, which means it has made full use 
the high-level semantic information in the auction game 
without sophisticated feature engineering and reacts to the 
changing auction environment immediately. 
We also introduce DASQN, an asynchronous stochastic 
Q-network which totally decouples the learning, observing 
and acting processes in Q-learning, hence greatly improv-
ing its run-time performance and enabling the algorithm to 
solve large scale real-world problems. 
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